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THE CHILD LABOR DETERRENCE ACT OF
1995: A CHOICE BETWEEN HEGEMONY
AND HYPOCRISY
[I]f there is any matter upon which civilized countries have
agreed-far more unanimously than they have with regard to
intoxicants and some other matters over which this country is
now emotionally aroused-it is the evil of premature and excessive child labor. 1
Exploitative child labor represents a large problem in many
parts of the world. 2 Current international human rights enforcement regimes and trade agreements have thus far been ineffective
in addressing this troublesome situation. 3 In response to the declining conditions and increasing episodes of child labor in recent
years,4 legislative action has began. In the absence of a comprehensive internationally accepted plan to deal with this problem,5
1 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 See Joan M. Smith, North American Free Trade and the Exploitation of Working Children, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 57, 57 (1994) (stating that "over 200 million child
workers are exploited around the world"); see also Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link:
Applying the InternationalTrading System To Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 364-65 (1995) (examining international labor standards and
demonstrating how combination of International Labor Organization ("ILO") and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GA IT")/World Trade Organization ("WTO") enforcement
and dispute procedures could better deter and sanction violations of forced and child labor);
Andrea Giampetro-Meyer et al., The Exploitation of Child Labor: An IntractableInternational Problem?, 16 Loy. L.A. INTL & CoMP. L.J. 657, 657-61 (1994) (defining problem of
child labor exploitation); James P. Kelleher, The Child Labor Deterrence Act: American
Unilateralismand the GATT, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 161, 193 (1994) (analyzing Child
Labor Deterrence Act ("CLDA") in light of United States' obligations under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade); Michael A. Tonya, Baby Steps Toward InternationalFair Labor Standards: Evaluating The Child Labor Deterrence Act, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
631, 632 (1992) (evaluating effects of Child Labor Deterrence Act on existing international
agreements, American workers, American importers, and foreign children).
3 See Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 374-77 (discussing ineffectiveness of current international human rights enforcement regimes); see also Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 2,
at 674 (suggesting ways international community might more effectively administer to
child labor exploitation). See generally infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (discussing
International Labor Organization's inability to enforce effectively international labor
standards).
4 See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 2, at 657-61 (defining problem of child labor
exploitation); see also 138 CONG. REc. S11,603-04 (1992) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (noting
UNICEF estimates between 80 and 200 million children work in manufacturing
industries).
5 See Kelleher, supra note 2, at 162 (discussing recent unilateral attempts by United
States to regulate economic activities overseas through threat of trade restrictions). See
generally ASSEFA BEQUELE, PROTECTING WORKING CHILDREN 69 (William E. Meyers ed.,
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the United States Congress has introduced the Child Labor Deterrence Act ("CLDA").
If enacted, CLDA would ban the importation of products which
are made, in whole or in part, by children under the age of fifteen,
and employed in either the manufacturing industry or mining. 7
Proponents of CLDA argue that the Act would allow the United
States to officially express and enforce its principled opposition to
the abhorrent practice of exploiting children for commercial gain."
Supporters further assert that as the primary market for products
made from child exploitation, the United States has the power to
halt child labor. 9 In contrast, opponents of the Act contend that
such unilateral10 action by the United States not only violates the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),"l but may also
1991) (providing global overview of child labor with focus on developing countries and suggesting remedial actions available to protect working children from exploitation).
6 S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
7 140 CONG. REC. E1,420-01 (1994) (statement of Rep. Brown) (introducing House version of CLDA); see also Child Laborand the New Global Marketplace:Reaping Profits at the
Expense of Children: Hearingon Child Labor Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1994) [hereinafter Child Labor and the New
Global Marketplace] (statement of Sen. Harkin) (citing United States Department of Labor's International Affairs Bureau study identifying industries and countries where child
labor is used to manufacture products from industry or mining); Rekha Basu, Stopping
Exploitationof Child Labor, DES MoniEs REG., May 1, 1994, at 2 (noting every American
purchase of products made by child labor contributes to exploitation of children); Tom Carney, Harkin:Imports Made Exploited Children, the Senator's "ChildLabor DeterrenceAct"
Would Stop Imports of Goods Made by Children Under the Age of 15, DES MOINES REG.,
Sept. 20, 1994, at 4 (noting Congress required Labor Department to identify countries and
industries utilizing child labor in industry or mining); Carl Hartman, Child Labor Reported
Rising; Bill Would Ban Imports, Assoc. PRESS (D.C.), Apr. 12, 1994 (discussing CLDA);
Julie Naughton, Harkin Child-Labor Bill Adds Senate Resolution, HFD-WELy HoME FURNISHINGS NEWSPAPER, Oct. 25, 1993, at 23 (noting Senator Harkin's assertion that United
States should prohibit products of child labor); Onapito-Ekomoloit, U.S.-Children:New Bill
Would Ban Child-Labor Imports, INTER PRESS GLOBAL INFo. NETWORK, July 17, 1995 (cit-

ing Senator Harkin's declaration that "United States must not import products made by
child labor.... [pleriod").
8 See 139 CONG. REC. E2,181-01 (1993) (statement of Rep. Brown) (calling for observance
of Children in Servitude Day by all Americans); Tonya, supra note 2, at 631 (arguing elimination of U.S. market for goods produced by child labor can reduce child exploitation); see
also Naughton, supra note 7, at 23 (agreeing with Sen. Harkin that prohibition of child
labor products should be national policy).
9 See Child Labor and the New Global Marketplace, supra note 7, at 8-10 (calling on
United States to use its vast "economic leverage and market to demand respect for human
life"); see also Onapito-Ekomoloit, supra note 7 (suggesting United States has power to stop
child labor because it is primary market for its products).
10 BLAcK's LAw DicToNARY 1531 (6th ed. 1990). Unilateral" is defined as one-sided; ex

parte; having relation to only one of two or more persons or things. Id.
11 See Kelleher, supra note 2, at 172 (charging CLDA would place "zero quota" on products produced by child labor in violation of GATT if enacted); see also Child Labor Targeted,
SAN ANToNIo ExPREss-NEws, June 18, 1995 (stating GAIT would prevent enforcement of

CLDA). But see Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 393-95 (analogizing child labor to dumping or
subsidies, both of which are unfair trade practices regulated by GATT/WTO); Kelleher,
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be harmful to the children it is intended to protect.12 As a result,
opponents recommend that the United States address the problem
13
of child labor through existing Multilateral Trade Agreements.
Part One of this Note explores the problem of child labor, citing
alarming statistics and egregious examples of children being exploited in the workplace. It will discuss the American response to
the child labor problem, providing a brief historical overview of
American legislative efforts to combat the problem on both the
federal and state levels and set forth the international standards
of child labor. Part One concludes that the problem of child labor
is not being ameliorated through socio-economic development fueled by global trade. Part Two analyzes the international enforcement of labor standards through both the International Labor Organization ("ILO") and the newest General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs establishing the World Trade Organization ("GATT/
WTO"). This section concludes that existing international agreements are ineffective as a means of enforcing child labor standards. Part Three provides a comprehensive assessment of the
Child Labor Deterrence Act. Part Four discusses the potential
ramifications of the CLDA under GATT, as well as possible United
States justifications for the GATT-legality of the CLDA. This section concludes that CLDA would most likely be found to be a unilateral trade measure in violation of, and inconsistent with, GATT
and the WTO. Part Five proposes possible solutions to the child
labor problem. This Note concludes that Congress should enact
the CLDA and immediately enforce it against non-subsidy agreement countries while simultaneously encouraging the President to
procure child labor restrictions within the WTO through amendment or side agreement.

supra note 2, at 173 (suggesting classification of prohibition of goods produced by child
labor as "internal" market regulation authorized by GATT or permissible under enumerated "general exceptions").
12 See Kelleher, supra note 2, at 180 (claiming that removing children from labor force
pursuant to CLDA will not increase their well being); see also Basu, supra note 7, at 2
(suggesting CLDA ultimately could cause hardship to children because halting imports
would result in serious economic consequences such as driving child labor further underground exposing children to greater exploitation).
13 BLAcsS LAw DICTIONARY 1015 (6th ed. 1990). A "multilateral agreement" is defined as
an agreement among more than two persons, firms or governments. Id.
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EXPLOITATION OF CHILD LABOR

Alarming Statistics and Egregious Examples

The Uruguay Round of GATT, the largest trade agreement in
history, 14 ended last year after seven years of intense negotiations. 15 Recently, the Uruguay Round negotiations were approved
by Congress.' 6 Unfortunately, the sweeping changes made in the
trade agreements 17 failed to address the needs and rights of
children.' 8
14 See Julie Long, Racheting Up Federalism:A Supremacy Clause Analysis of NAFTA
and the Uruguay Round Agreements, 80 MINN.L. REV. 231, 265 n.3 (1995) (quoting President Clinton's characterization of agreements as "broadest, most comprehensive trade
agreements in history"); see also Note, Developing Countriesand MultilateralTrade Agreements: Law and the Promise of Development, 108 HARv.L. REV. 1715, 1715 (1995) (stating
that Uruguay Round "promises to constitute 'the largest, most comprehensive trade agreements in history" (quoting Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103 Cong., 2d Sess. 211 (1994) (statement of United
States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor))).
15 See General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiation, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143-272
(1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round]. The establishment of the World Trade Organization
resulted from seven years of trade negotiations. Id. at 1144.
16 Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1994); see House Floor
Debate RegardingH.R. 5110, The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, FEDERAL NEWS
SERV. WASH. PACKAGE, Nov. 29, 1994 (providing statements by Reps. Dan Rostenkowksi
and Nancy Johnson expressing strong support for Uruguay Round Act's and common set of
rules for all trading partners); see also Memorandum for the United States Trade Represen.
tative on WTO Agreement, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 23, 1994 (containing memorandum released by White House directing trade representative to accept Uruguay Round Agreement); PresidentialProclamationon Implementation of UruguayRoundtable Provisions:To
Implement Certain Provisions of Trade Agreements from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,U.S. NEwswIRE, Mar. 23, 1995 (containing presidential proclamation of congressional approval of Uruguay Round Agreements Act).
17 See Gerald R. Ford, Why We Need GATT Now, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1994, at A8
(noting sweeping changes prevent lawless international jungle); see also Jay Branegan, Put
Up or Shut Up (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), TnAE, Dec. 20, 1994, at 46
(describing Uruguay Round as "sweeping in scope and numbing in detail"); Clare Nullis,
GATT Chief Criticizes GOP, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 19, 1994, at C4 (addressing Uruguay
Round's sweeping cuts in customs and subsidies); Tense Times for Trade Pact, FIN. POST,
Nov. 15, 1994, at 18 (discussing broadening of Uruguay Round to include sweeping tariff
reductions); Anne Veigle, 7 Richest CountriesPut Growth at Top of Meeting Agenda, WASH.
Tnms, July 7, 1992, at A9 (noting Uruguay Rounds' vast changes in trade rules set rules
for most of world); Mitchell Zuckoff, Taking a Profit, and Inflicting a Cost, U.S. Firms Seeking Riches Among the ForeignPoor, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 1994, at 1 (indicating Uruguay
Round is history's most far-reaching trade treaty).
18 See Lynn Kamm, Trade ProsperityArrives on the Backs of Little Children, SEATTLE
TnmEs, Nov. 27, 1994, at B9 (indicating that GATT does nothing for child workers in developing nations); see also Group of Seven Ministers Hold Labor Summit-Global Unemployment Discussed,WORLD NEWS DIGEST FACTS ON FIL, Mar. 24, 1994 (noting unlikelihood of
strong support among GATT members for GATT social clause codifying restrictions on
child labor); Debra Percival, Trade-Labor: EU Pushes ForLink Between Trade and Labor
Rights, INTER PRESS SERVICE GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, Mar. 27, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2259965, at *1 (noting that although Uruguay Round of GATT "broke
new ground" in protecting intellectual property and investment rights, no link between
trade and workers' rights was forged); Richard Rothstein, FairWages and StandardsSpur
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According to the ILO, an estimated 200 million children under
the age of fifteen are working as industrial laborers in developing
nations. 19 Children under age fifteen constitute approximately
twenty percent of the work force in Africa,20 a reported twelve to
twenty-six percent in many Latin American countries, 2 and
eleven percent in some Asian countries.22 Child labor endangers a
Growth: Workers'Rights Shouldn't Be Abandoned in GATT, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1994, at 7
(pointing out Uruguay Round almost failed as result of Clinton Administration demands
for "international worker rights"); Mitchell Zuckoff, Free Trade, Human Rights Clash Over
GATT, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1994, at 77 (stating that although ban on child labor was
repeatedly discussed throughout GATT negotiations, developing countries blocked its inclusion by portraying it as protectionism).
19 138 CONG. REC. S11,603-04 (1992) (statement of Sen. Harkin). "In many developing
countries children represent a substantial portion of the work force and can be found in
such industries as glass, metal works, textiles, mining and fireworks manufacturing." Id.
"UNICEF estimates that between 80 and 200 million children fall into [these] categor[ies]
(industry or mining)." Id.; see Stan Grossfeld, Trapped in a Hellhole, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
29, 1994, at A8 (citing ILO estimates of 200 million child laborers under age 15 worldwide);
see also Kamm, supra note 18, at B9 (discussing evolution of GATT); Slave-Like Child Labor Growing in Asia, Africa, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 28, 1993, at A8 (according to
U.N. estimates up to 30% of children ages 10 to 14 work full-time in some countries, many
in hazardous or slave-like conditions); Robin Wright, Labor of Children Fuelling Boom in
Third World, EDMONTON J., May 15, 1994, at C3 (citing ILO estimate of one in four children
between ages 10 and 14 working in Third World countries).
20 Labor: ILO Finds Child Labor Biggest Source of Child Abuse, INTER PRESS SERVICE
GLOBAL INFo. NETWORK, July 21, 1992, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 2490541, at *3
[hereinafter ILO Finds] (noting in some African Countries, 20% of all children are forced to

work); see Keith C. Epstein, U.S. Report Gives Details of Worldwide Child Labor: Sweatshops Documented, SUNDAY PATRIOT NEWS, Oct. 2, 1994, at A10 (stating Africa has world's
highest child labor rate, with one in three children working like adults); see also Lewis
Machipisa, Zimbabwe-Children: Child Labor Takes on Tragic Proportions,INTER PRESS
SERVICE GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, June 16, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL
2261808, *1 [hereinafter Zimbabwe Children] (warning that child labor likely to become
national tragedy in Zimbabwe by end of century).
21 ILO Finds, supra note 20, at *3 (noting up to 26% of children work in some countries);
see 139 CONG. REc. E1,784-01 (1993) (statement of Rep. Brown) (pointing to reports that up
to 18% of Mexican children between ages 12 and 14 are working (reading from Lynn
Kamm, How Our Greed Keeps Kids Trapped in ForeignSweatshops, WASH. POST, Mar. 28,
1993, at C5)); see also Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 369-70 (exposing forced child labor in
Dominican Republic's state-run sugarcane plantations with children 14 and under); Tonya,
supra note 2, at 631 (recounting story of 12 year-old Mexican boy who was told that he no
longer had to go to school but would instead begin working full-time spreading toxic glue on
sneakers); Wright, supra note 19, at C3 (reporting children constitute about 18% of Brazil's
work force).
22 ILO Finds, supra note 20, at *3; see 141 CONG. REc. E1,507-01 (1995) (statement of
Rep. Burton) (indicating estimates by non-governmental organizations of child labor in India approach 50 million); see also Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 371-74 (examining slavery,
forced labor, bonded labor, and child labor in India and noting that children as young as 10
are either sold, kidnapped or tricked into bondage); Tonya, supra note 2, at 631 (stating
that sickly Thailand children laborers rarely see daylight and cling to legs of policemen
raiding sweatshops where they work); Epstein, supra note 20, at A8 (stating that one-quarter of world's work force between ages five and 15, approximately 17.5 million boys and
girls, is in India); Peter J. Spielmann, Child Slavery: Millions of Asian Kids Caught in
Long, Cruel Labor, DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 1995, at A2 (reporting Anti-Slavery Society
estimate that between 73 million and 115 million children are working in India); John
Stackhouse, Little Match Girls ParentsBlamed for Child-LaborAbuses in India, Cm. TRm.,
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child's welfare and impedes a child's development.2" In some instances, an estimated one-half of these children work under hazardous or life-threatening conditions and eventually contract
debilitating diseases that lead to death.24 Hazardous industries
particularly conducive to child labor include glass or metal works,
textiles, mining and fireworks manufacturing.25 In the overwhelming majority of these cases, children are not working voluntarily, but are bonded or slave-laborers. 26 For instance, debt bondage, a particularly exploitative form of child labor, occurs when
children are sold by their parents in consideration for a previous
Jan. 30, 1994, at 4 (reporting rampant child labor in South Asia, including India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka); Wright, supra note 19, at C3 (noting that one in four
Indian workers is under age 14).
23 Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 2, at 657. The article provides that child labor can
be defined as work placing a heavy burden on the child or endangering the child's safety,
health or welfare. Id. The term was also categorized as that work that: takes advantage of
the defenseless child; exploits the child as a cheap substitute for adult labor; uses the
child's effort but does not contribute to development; or impedes education and training,
prejudicing his or her future. Id. (quoting Report of Director General, Child Labor, 69 INT'L
LAB. CoNF. 3, 37 (1983)); see Smith, supra note 2, at 57 (defining exploited children as those
forced prematurely into adulthood by long work hours and low pay with threats to health
and well-being).
24 138 CONG. REc. S11,603-04, S11,608 (1992) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (indicating
many child-laborers work in dangerous industries); see Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 374
(estimating that 76% of children working in glass factories have tuberculosis caused by
glasswork hazards); see also Kelleher, supra note 2, at 161 (citing ILO estimate that half of
50,000 bonded child laborers in Pakistan's carpet-weaving industry will die of disease and
malnutrition before age twelve); ILO Finds, supra note 20, at *3 (revealing that child laborers are often exposed to high risks, develop life-long injuries and deformities and are infected with AIDS resulting from sexual abuse by employers); Amelia A. Newcomb, Protection of World's Young: Clocking Out On Child Labor, CimIsTIAN SCI. MON., Nov. 16, 1994,
at 1 (stating that children in Bombay, Manila and Bogota handle toxic substances, often for
14 hours each day); Rothstein, supra note 18, at F3 (noting that half of children in Pakistan's export carpet industry die from malnutrition and disease before age 12); Wright,
supra note 19, at C3 (reporting that in 1992 fire at Chinese fireworks factory 20 workers
killed were between nine and 14 years old).
25 See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S11,603-04, S11,607 (1992) (noting major industries responsible for exploiting child labor).
26 See 139 CONG. REc. E2181-01, E2182 (1993) (statement of Rep. Brown). The Congressman reported that 10 million children in India alone are bonded laborers. Id.; see also Kelleher, supra note 2, at 187. The article maintains that there is no social, economic, or cultural justification for children to be put to work as bonded laborers in near slave-like
conditions. Id. China, the Dominican Republic and India all have been examined as having
situations of child labor involving slavery, bonded labor, prison labor and forced labor.
See also Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 366-74. Children forced to work in sweat shops are
subject to locked doors and windows in order to prevent escape. Id.; Spielmana, supra note
22, at A2 (citing Paul Bravender-Coyle, spokesman for Australia's Anti-Slavery Society).
The Anti-Slavery Society estimates the number of child slave laborers to be between 73 and
115 million in India, 8 million in Pakistan, 5.7 million in Nepal, 5.5 million in the Philippines, 5 million in China, 2.8 million in Bangladesh, 2.4 million in Indonesia, 1.1 million in
Thailand, and 500,000 in Sri Lanka. API, Sept. 18, 1995, availablein WESTLAW, 1995 WL
4406633, at *1-2.

1996]

CHILD LABOR DETERRENCE ACT

debt. 27 The statistics provided in this section evidence the fact
that the child labor problem is one of universal proportions.28
Despite the significant increase in many countries of the
number of child laborers 29 and the deteriorating working conditions for these children, 30 few countries have developed comprehensive plans to address this growing problem. 31 The failure to
address the child labor dilemma is particularly alarming given the
recent economic growth in developing countries attributable to international trade.32
While the amount of child labor pervading the international
community is troubling,3 3 specific incidents of abuse are truly
shocking. A congressional hearing on child labor in September of
27 Epstein, supra note 20, at A10 (quoting Department of Labor Report); ILO Finds,
supra note 20, at *3 (referring to common situation where parents agree to let children
work off debt that parents cannot repay); Wright, supra note 19, at C3 (reporting debt
bondage, also known as "enganche" or "the hook," is problem in Peruvian mines).
28 See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 2, at 659 (noting that over 100 million child
laborers from all around world are exposed to hazardous and life-threatening conditions);
Wright, supra note 19, at C3 ("Child labor is single most important source of child abuse
and exploitation in world." (quoting Michael Hansenne, General Director of ILO)); see also
Daniel Skoler, Throughout the World, Children Cry... We Want Rights, Too, 17 J. Hum.
RTs. 30, 32 (1990) (discussing U.N. Convention on Rights of Children).
29 See 141 CONG. REC., supra note 22, at El, 507-01 (indicating number of child laborers
in India approaches 50 million); see also ILO Finds, supra note 20, at *3 (noting in some
african countries, 20% of all children are forced to work); Wright, supra note 19, at C3
(reporting children constitute about 18% of Brazil's work force).
30 See, e.g., Child Labor and the New Global Marketplace, supra note 7, at 50-52
(describing plight of leather and textile child workers); see also Grossfeld, supra note 19, at
A8 (describing plight of eight-year-old carpet worker in India).
31 E.g., Newcomb, supra, note 24, at 1 (noting recent U.S. Dep't of Lab. Bureau of Intl
Lab. Affairs report targeting 19 countries employing extensive child labor in production of
goods for United States market); Rothstein, supra note 18, at F3 (reporting that Philippines abolished factory age requirements to attract investors); Stackhouse, supra note 22,
at A20 (despite abolishing child labor in 1986, Indian enforcement of child labor prohibitions is weak in almost every state); Wright, supranote 19, at C3 (expressing that although
child labor was declining for many years, it is currently on rise in developing countries); see
Kelleher, supra note 2, at 162 (indicating that although conditions are worsening and
number of child workers are increasing, few countries are dealing with problem of child
labor); see also Tonya, supra note 2, at 631 (noting child labor thrives because bans are
rarely enforced).
32 See generally Walter J. Camper, ProsperityLinked to Lowering of InternationalTrade
Barriers, RoANOKE TIMES & WoRLD NEWS, Feb. 27, 1993, at All (reporting that World
Bank study delineated close relation between economic growth and environmental improvement in developing countries); Dreamingof Golden Ages, FiN. TIMEs, May 20, 1995, at
D6 (noting that Asian countries' growth took place amidst industrial nations' recession);
World Economy Slowing, U.N. Says, STAR-Tnm. (Minn.), Sept. 12, 1995, at D3 (citing
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report that "developing countries'
growth will continue to outstrip that of industrialized economies").
33 See 138 CONG. REc., supra note 19, at Sll, 603-04 (noting UNICEF estimates approximately 200 million child laborers are under age 15 worldwide); see also Giampetro-Meyer
et al., supra note 2, at 659 (noting that over 100 million child laborers from all around
world are exposed to hazardous and life-threatening conditions).
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1994 revealed that underage child workers frequently receive
beatings for their tardiness and mistakes.3 4 For example, at one
Senate hearing the story was told of a young Pakistani rug weaver
hung upside down from a ceiling fan because he missed work.35 A
1995 study conducted by the United States Department of Labor
reports of Asian children in the Persian Gulf being glued or tied to
camels during races.36 Even more egregious are incidents of children burned to death by their employers 37 or forced to watch their
as relatives are beaten to death.3 8 Perhaps the most poignant account of child labor abuse is that of the violent and senseless
death of a twelve-year-old Pakistani youth who outspokenly crusaded against child slavery.39
34 Child Labor and the New Global Marketplace, supra note 7, at 17-23. 19 year-old
Nazma Akther of Bangladesh traveled halfway around the world to tell her plight to Congress. Id. At 11 years old, Nazma began working at the Shams garment factory in Dhaka,
where she was paid eight dollars a month for 70 hour work weeks. Id. She was beaten for
tardiness or mistakes. Id. See Kamm, supra note 18, at B9 (noting Nazma Akther's testimony at Senate child labor hearing).
35 Child Labor and the New Global Marketplace, supra note 7, at 50-52 (statement of
Neil Earney of International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Federation) (describing incident where boy was dragged from his bed and hung upside down from ceiling fan for
two days as punishment for missing work due to illness); Kamm, supra note 18, at B9
(noting Neil Earney's testimony at Senate child labor hearing); Working Children Tell Poor
Conditions, CH. SUN TumEs, Sept. 22, 1994, at 57 (describing tales of abuse told to Senate
by child workers from Brazil, Honduras and Bangladesh).
36 Brian Tumulty, Labor DepartmentExamines Child Labor, GANNE-r NEws SERV., Oct.
11, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2908382, at *1 (discussing Department of Labor report on child labor).
37 Paul Murphy, Sad PlightofIndia's Child Workers, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 1994, at A14.
Jaffer Imam was sold by his poverty stricken parents into bonded labor at an Indian embroidery factory. Id. The factory conditions under which he worked were so severe that
within six months, Jaffer told his boss he could no longer work. Id. In a fit of rage, his boss
threw kerosene over the boy and set him on fire. Id. Jaffer died a painful death, with burns
covering 98% of his body. Id. The Indian government has neither publicly condemned the
slaying, nor compensated the boy's family. Id.
38 Grossfeld, supra note 19, at A8. Eight-year-old Laxmi Sada was kidnapped while playing with friends outside his Indian village. Id. He was then taken in a bus to a carpet
factory. Id. When he cried, he was beaten with a punja, a comb-like tool. Id. When blood
flowed from his wounds, his employers would light matchstick powder on the wound to stop
the bleeding. Id. In an attempt to rescue him from this abuse, Laxmi's father arrived at the
factory only to be intercepted by factory personnel. Id. Instead of reuniting with his son,
Laxmi's father received a fatal beating. Id.
39 Joe P. Bean, Another Child Killed in Ruthless World, SAN ANToNIo EXPRESS-NEws,
Apr. 27, 1995. Iqbal Masih was shot and killed in April 1995 as he and two friends rode
their bicycles through their Pakistani village. Id. Iqbal's parents had sold him into slavery
when he was four years old to satisfy a $16 debt. Id. For six years, Iqbal worked 12 hour
days chained to a loom in unsafe, unhealthy conditions. Id. The dust within the carpet
factory in which Iqbal worked, severely damaged his respiratory system and made it difficult for him to breathe. Id. Two years ago, Iqbal escaped from the carpet factory. Id. He
began attending school and, eventually, became an outspoken crusader against child slavery both in his country and abroad. Id. Iqbal recruited villagers to fight against the forced
labor and exploitation of children. Id. Iqbal planned to become a lawyer, and Brandeis University offered him a full scholarship. Id. Unfortunately, Iqbal would never attend Bran-
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United States Efforts to Combat Child Labor

CLDA represents a continued effort by the United States to
combat child labor on both national and global levels. 40 While protective of American workers, 4 1 the bill also advocates a strong policy toward the resolution of this human rights issue on a global

deis. Id. His eloquence and pursuit of exposing child exploitation brought death threats
from Pakistani carpet manufacturers whose profits had been threatened. Id. Within a short
time, Iqbal was murdered. Id. When he died, he was 12 years old, weighed only 50 pounds
and was not taller than the average six-year-old American child. Id.; see also, Kathy Gannon, Young Activist's Death Hits PakistaniCarpet Sales Trade: Exports to West Have Diminished Even Though Producers Haven't Been Linked to Death of 12 Year-Old Who
Fought Child Labor, L.A. TIm~s, May 31, 1995, at 7 (suggesting Iqbal's death has caused
loss in sales of Pakistani carpets to West); News in Brief, CmHsTIAN SCI. MON., Apr. 19,
1995, at 2 (describing tragic story of Iqbal).
40 See Child Labor and the New Global Marketplace, supra note 7, at 8-10 (discussing
Senator Harkin's call for United States to comand respect for basic human rights); Tonya,
supra note 2, at 655 (noting congressional view America should positively encourage dignified treatment of children). But see, e.g., Kelleher, supra note 2, at 180-81 (implying American concern may not truly lie in improving situation of children in developing countries);
Tonya, supra note 2, at 661 (suggesting CLDA, insofar as it is based on theory that children
from other countries are taking American jobs, appeals to same protectionist sentiment
that flowered in 1980's); see also Aiming at Child Labor, CHRISTIN SCI. MON., Apr. 18,
1994, at 18 (warning careful language should be used to keep CLDA from being protectionist); Newcomb, supra note 24, at 1 (noting criticism of CLDA as protectionist); Satyanarayan Sivaraman, Asia-Children:Child Abuse Still Rampant Throughout Region, INTER PRESS SERVICE GLOBAL INFo. NETWORK, June 22, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994
WL 2580573, at *2 (citing Asian attack on CLDA as "protectionist ploy" designed to save
jobs in developed countries); World Must Quit Enslaving Kids, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 28,
1994, A10 (expressing concern CLDA would violate GATT's anti-protectionist thrust).
41 See 135 CONG. REC. H2,161-02, H2,161 (1989) (statement of Rep. Pease). Representative Pease expressed disapproval of compelling competition between "American workers
and importers promoting the manufacture of goods made by brutalized children slaving
away under medieval working conditions." Id.; see also Kelleher, supra note 2, at 192.
CLDA has been criticized as protectionist because one of its goals seems to be the improvement of the United States economic situation. Id. The bill would have the direct effect of
denying employment to foreign children while simultaneously boosting American employment in the same industries. Juli Stensland, InternationalizingThe North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 4 MIN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 141, 149 (1995). Developing countries are staunchly opposed to global labor standards set by developed countries. Id. The
fear is that the imposition of international labor standards deprive developing countries of
low cost labor, which is their competitive advantage in international trade. Child Labor;
Boy's Death Should Stir U.S. Conscience, STAR TPIm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 25, 1995,
at A12. The first two versions of the bill were dismissed as too protectionist. Id. The true
legislative intent of CLDA has been purported to be to protect United States textile interests and not foreign children. Register'sReaders Say, DES MOINES REG., Aug. 5, 1992, at 6.
But see World Must Quit Enslaving Kids, supra note 40, at A10. Concerns that CLDA violates GATs anti-protectionist provisions are overblown because many of the violating industries have no American counterparts. Id.
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scale.42 An assessment of the bill in the context of past American
efforts in this area supports this interpretation.4 3
Following the Civil War, northern states experienced difficulty
prohibiting child labor out of fear that southern states would lure
industry to relocate with promises of deregulation. 44 This situation inspired federal action which manifested itself in the passage
of federal laws to end the child labor crisis. 45 The Child Labor Law

of 191646 was an attempt to do this by prohibiting the employment
of children under the age of sixteen in factories and manufacturing establishments.47 The United States Supreme Court, however,
declared the Act an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. 48 Thereafter, Congress enacted the Tax on Employment of Child Labor,4 s which attempted
to impose a ten percent tax on the total profit of any employer
42 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS (1994)
(statements by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Counselor Tim Wirth, Asst. Secretary John Shattuck) (pointing out serious child labor problems in export industries and
impact of international trade on worker rights standards). See generally CHILDREN AND

YOUTH SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL POLICY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF

THE NATIONAL CImL LABOR COMMITrEE 1905-06 (Robert H. Bremner et al. eds., 1974) (detailing proceedings of first, second and third annual meetings of National Child Labor Committee and containing essays on child labor).
43 See Rothstein, supra note 18, at F3 (discussing international problems of child labor
and American legislative efforts to combat child labor).
44 See Rothstein, supra note 18, at F3 (indicating that developing nations cannot control
abuses of child labor because employers retaliate with relocation); Tonya, supra note 2, at
635 ("Businessmen in these [Southern] states competed with the North much as the less
developed compete with industrial giants in the twentieth century; by exploiting cheap labor."). See generally ELIZABETH LEWIS OTEY, CHILDREN AND YOUTH SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND
SOCIAL POLICY: THE BEGINNING OF CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION IN CERTAIN STATES 73-204
(1974) (providing state by state analysis of child labor legislation in nineteenth century).
45 See Rothstein, supra note 18, at F3 (discussing approval of Fair Labor Standards Act
in 1938). See generally WALTER I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMIrrEE AND CHImn LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 45-163
(1970) (providing detailed discussion of United States' history in dealing with child labor
including federal child labor legislation, proposed federal child labor amendment and Fair
Labor Standards Act).
4 Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, Pub. L. No. 249, 39 Stat. 675, 675-76 [hereinafter Act of
19161 (declared unconstitutional by Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918),
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941)).
47 Act of 1916, supra note 46, at 675.
48 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271-72 (prohibiting use of Commerce Clause power to regulate
goods manufactured at factories through use of child labor because Child Labor Act regulated "manufacturing" not "commerce"), overruled by Darby, 312 U.S. at 116-17 ("The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart, was a departure from the principles
which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since
the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has long been
exhausted.").
49 Title XII of the Revenue Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 1200, 40 Stat. 1138, 1139 [hereinafter Revenue Act of 1919] (declared unconstitutional by Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.
259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922)).
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utilizing child labor.50 This attempt to use the taxing power as a
conduit to regulate child labor, however, was also ruled
unconstitutional.5 '
In 1924, Congress proposed a Child Labor Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 2 The proposed amendment sought to
empower Congress with the authority to set a minimum age for
employment. 53 After fourteen years of consideration, the amendment proposal failed.5 4 Although twenty-eight states voted to ratify the amendment,5 5 the ratification process mandated approval
by thirty-six of the forty-eight existing states.56 Finally, in 1938,
during the Great Depression, the federal government succeeded in
enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 57 which sets a
minimum age for the employment of children in industries whose
products enter interstate commerce. 58 Upon review, the Supreme
50 Revenue Act of 1919, supra note 49, § 1200. The Act provided that employers of child
labor be subject to "an excise tax equivalent to 10 per centum" of their entire net profits. Id.
The Act empowered the Commissioner and the Secretary of Labor to inspect industries. Id.
§ 1206, 40 Stat. 1138, 1140. Obstruction of an inspection was made punishable by fine and
imprisonment. Id.
51 Bailey, 259 U.S. at 39 (holding unconstitutional pretextual use of taxing power because it imposed prohibitive tax rate on employers of child laborers).
52 H.R.J. Res. 184, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
53 Id. The proposed amendment gave Congress the power to prohibit persons under the
age of eighteen from working. Id. § 1.
54 Id. Section One of the proposed amendment would have given Congress the power to
"limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under 18 years of age." Id. § 1. Section
Two would have left state power unimpaired except to the extent necessary to implement
the Congressional legislation. Id. § 2. See generally Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456
(1939) (affirming judgment of Kansas Supreme Court denying writ of mandamus to legislators who brought action attacking state senate vote in favor of ratification of Child Labor
Amendment).
5 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 473 (providing state by state chronology of Child Labor Amendment); see Robert E. Hoyt, Dealing With Child Labor, Now That GATT Has Passed,ARiZ.
REp., Dec. 11, 1974, at F3 (indicating that it took 14 years for 28 states to ratify
amendment).
5 U.S. CONST. art. V. Amendments to the United States Constitution must be ratified by
the "legislatures of three fourths of the several states." Id.; see Hoyt, supra note 55, at F3
(indicating approval by 36 states necessary to pass Child Labor Amendment).
57 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1938) amended in 29 U.S.C. § 212
(1974).
58 29 U.S.C §§ 212(a)-(c) (1988). The child labor provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act prohibit producers, manufacturers or dealers from placing in interstate commerce goods produced by "any oppressive child labor." Id. § 212(a). The Act instructs the
Secretary of Labor to conduct investigations into the employment of children and to bring
actions for violations of the Act. Id. § 212(b). The Act applies to "any enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." Id. § 212(c); see Hoyt, supra note 55,
at F3 (demonstrating how Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits children under 16 years of
age from working in industries whose goods enter interstate commerce); see also Rothstein,
supra note 18, at F3 (noting that Fair Labor Standards Act outlaws factory labor by
children).
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Court upheld the constitutionality of FLSA.5 9 In addition to
FLSA, many states have passed their own child labor legislation. 60 These state laws include regulations such as the minimum
age of employment,6" the maximum hours of work,62 the minimum
wage, 63 the scope of employment, 6 4 and a comprehensive method

of record keeping. 65 Stringent civil and criminal penalties are prescribed for violations of these laws. 66 Although child labor legislation has been fairly effective in protecting children from hazard59 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941) (overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding Fair Labor Standards Act constitutional as within
Commerce Clause and consistent with Fifth and Tenth Amendments)).
60 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-8-32 (Supp. 1995); ALASKA STAT. § 23.15.490 (1990); CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 51769.5 (West 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1006 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 450.001 (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 450.121 (West 1981); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 390-1 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, para. 205/17 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE § 22-37-9.2 (1995); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 71-1-29 (1995); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3331.12 (Baldwin
1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.545 (1993); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 66.1 (1992); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-13-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976), S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 26-4-9 (1984); VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-114 (Michie 1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.380 (1996); W. VA. CODE
§ 21-6-8a (1966); Wis. STAT. § 103.69 (West 1988).
61 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 450.045 (West Supp. 1996) (proof of age); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 390-3 (1988) (employment of minors under 18 years of age); IDAHO CODE § 44-1301 (1977)
(restrictions on employment of children under 14); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, paras. 205/1,
205/8 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (minimum age); N.J. ANN. STAT. § 34:2-21.3 (West 1993).
62 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49116 (West 1989) (maximum work outside school hours);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 387-15 (1988) (wage and hour law); IDAHO CODE § 44-1304 (1977) (working hours for children under 16); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, paras. 205/3, 205/5 (Smith-Hurd
1993) (hours of work and posting of hours); N.J. ANN. STAT. § 34:2-21.3 (West 1995) (hours
of work); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1301.203 (1992) (wages and hours).
63 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 78249 (West 1989) (worker's compensation); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 440.54 (West 1981) (workers' compensation); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1 (1994) (workers' compensation); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, paras. 305/7, 305/8 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (amount
of compensation in fatal and non-fatal cases); IND. CODE § 22-3-7-9 (1995) (double compensation for certain minors); Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.250 (1993) (compensation computation);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 672 (1992) (liability and compensation to minors illegally
employed); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.420 (1996) (exclusive remedies); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.32 (West 1988).
64 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 450.132 (West 1981) (employment of children by entertainment industry); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1306, 1307 (1977) (prohibition against theatrical employment or employment in immoral surroundings); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, paras. 205/7,
205/8.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (minors employed in hazardous occupations and entertainment
related performances); N.J. ANN. STAT. § 34:2-21.58 (West 1993) (employment of minors in
theatrical productions).
65 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3506 (1974) (child labor law records); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 390-3 (1988) (certificates of employment); IDAHO CODE § 44-1303 (1977) (employers
to keep record of minor employees); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, paras. 205/6, 205/17.6 (SmithHurd 1993) (time records and reports of work-related death, injury or illness).
66 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3513 (1974) (child labor law penalties applicable to
employer); HAW. REV. STAT. § 390-7 (1988) (penalties); IDAHO CODE § 44-1305 (1977) (penalty for violations of chapter); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, para. 205/17.3 (Smith-Hurd 1995)
(fines and penalties); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.12.390, 49.12.410 (1995) (violations-civil
and criminal penalties).
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ous employment in the United States,6 7 efforts to combat child
labor in the United States have continued on both the federal68
and state levels. 9
C.

InternationalStandards of Child Labor

CLDA imposes a minimum age requirement of fourteen years
for child labor.7 ° It has been suggested that such a rigid, fixed
standard is both arbitrary and ethnocentric. 7 1 This standard is,
however, in accord with the internationally recognized standard
72
set by the ILO.
Following World War I, the ILO emerged as the entity responsible for defining international labor standards and facilitating
their universal application. 73 The Preamble to the ILO Constitu67 See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 2, at 670-71 (noting initial success of United
States' enforcement of child labor regulations to decrease incidence of child labor). But see
Hartman, supra note 7. Hartman cites a government report that child labor problems worsened in the United States, nearly tripling between 1985-89. Id.; Joseph P. Ritz, Crackdown
Set on Child Labor Violations, BuFFALo NEWS, May 30, 1993, at B9. According to the Executive Director of National Child Labor Committee, even though New York State has what
is considered stringent child labor legislation an estimated seven thousand children work
in New York City sweatshops. Id. In Texas the state senate is concerned that far too many
children are engaged in risky employment. Child LaborBill: State Senate PassedIt, House
Should Follow Suit, Hous. CHRON., May 11, 1993, at 12.
68 See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 2, at 661-67 (examining United States federal
legislation regulating child labor); Patricia McLaughlin, Do Americans Care About Child
Labor? We'll Find Out, VARIETY, May 12, 1993, at 8E (highlighting Sen. Metzenbaum's
recently introduced federal child labor bill designed to increase enforcement and stiffen
penalties of child labor laws); see also 137 CONG. REc. S2,927-02, 2,956 (1991) (statement of
Sen. Metzenbaum) (proposing child labor amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
to better enforce its child labor provisions).
69 See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 2, at 661-67 (examining recent state laws regulating child labor); see also Pamela J. Podger, Panel OK's Major Reforms in State Child
LaborLaws, FRESNO BEE, July 15, 1993, at B1 (discussing increasing protection for California children afforded by "sweeping reforms" in its child labor legislation); Ritz, supra note
67, at B9 (noting New York State Labor Department creation of team of inspectors responsible for investigating child labor violations); Nancy Stancill, LegislatorsDraft Bills to Beef
Up Child Labor Laws, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1993, at 25 (discussing proposed Texas child
labor legislation that would allow increased civil and criminal penalties for violations).
70 S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(a)(2) (1995).
71 See Kelleher, supra note 2, at 181-82 (arguing that adoption of rigid age-based definition of child assumes universal appropriate age of employment and ignores cross-cultural
differences regarding children's societal roles).
72 See Constitution of the International Labor Organization arts. 227-53, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CODE 1939 140-76 (1939).
"Children under the age of 15 years shall not be employed or work in any public or private
industrial undertaking...." Id. at 140; see also Tonya, supra note 2, at 633. "International
fair labor standards, as distinguished from domestic standards of individual countries, provide for the minimum rights of workers and serve as a 'benchmark' applicable to all countries." Id. at 633-34.
73 See GoTE HANSON, SOCIAL CLAusEs AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR STANDARDS IN TRADE POLICY 11-29 (1983) (providing historical review of labor

standards and international trade); Tonya, supra note 2, at 638-39 (discussing early en-
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tion mandates the regulation of working conditions, including
maximum hours, adequate wages and the protection of children.74
Nations adopt ILO standards or regulations in the form of conventions.75 Each member nation has the option of ratifying these
conventions. 76
While conventions and standards are binding on those nations
that ratify them, nations that do not ratify such measures cannot
be compelled to implement them. 77 The United States, itself, has
ratified eleven conventions. 78 In addition, Congress has recognized and incorporated five of those conventions into federal legisforcement of labor standards); see also JOHN H. JACKSON & WILL.AM J. DAVEY, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CASES, MATERIAIS, AND TEXT 280 (2d

ed. 1986) (noting ILO's purpose is amelioration of working and living standards); Lance
Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in InternationalTrade, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 165, 175-79 (1993) (discussing development of ILO and its present day effect on international trade community). See generally Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 381-83 (providing indepth discussion of structure and working conditions of ILO).
74 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, supra note 72, § 1. As indicated in the preamble, the ILO Constitution seeks to remedy labor conditions "involving
such injustice [and] hardship" which would threaten world peace and harmony. Id. It further states that the failure of any nation to adopt humane working conditions creates an
obstacle to the other nations who desire to improve working conditions. Id. The United
States entered into the proclamation on Sept. 10, 1934. See 49 Stat. 2712, T.S. No. 874.
75 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, supra note 72, at art. 19, § 111. As of December 1993, 173 conventions had been ratified, each of which had been
adopted by as many as 1 to 135 different nations. Id.; see Lists of Ratification by Convention and by Country, Int'l Labor Conf., 81st Sess., Report III (part 5), ILO, Geneva 268
(1994).
76 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, supra note 72, at art. 19, § 111; see VmGINu A. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABouR CoNvENTIONS AND NATIONAL LAw: THE
EFFEcTrIvENEss OF THE AUTOMATIC INCORPORATION OF TREATIES IN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMs 9-11 (1982) (explaining effect of ILO conventions on national law); Stensland, supra

note 41, at 144 (describing ILO's system of conventions binding nations to certain labor
standards). See generally JAMES AvERY JOYCE, WORLD LABoUR RIGHTS AND THEIR PROTECTION 26 (1980) (analyzing objectives and activities of ILO system).
77 Stensland, supra note 41, at 148. Nations in the ILO that do not ratify a convention

are nevertheless bound or obligated to report to the ILO the position that their national law
takes with regard to the unratified convention or recommendation. Id.; see Ehrenberg,
supra note 2, at 389-90 (noting ILO provides technical assistance to member states in ratifying and applying conventions); see also Compa, supra note 73, at 179 (stating that
although not required to ratify convention, nations are required to submit conventions to
national leaders and report progress to ILO). See generally ABDUL-KARUm TmiaTi, TRIPARTISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 276-79 (1982Xdiscussing obligation of
states to ratify international labor conventions).
78 Stensland, supra note 41, at 143 n.14. Seven of the conventions that the United States

has ratified deal with the labor rights of seafarers while the other four deal with Tripartite
Consultation, Merchant Shipping, Forced Labour, and Labour Statistics. Id. Specifically,
the conventions are: Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, Oct. 29, 1919 (No. 5); Minimum
Age (Sea) Convention, June 15, 1920 (No. 7); Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention, Oct.
25, 1921 (No. 10); Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers) Convention, October 25, 1921
(No. 15); Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention, June 3, 1937 (No. 60);
Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), Oct. 22, 1936 (No. 58); Minimum Age (Industry)
Convention (Revised), June 3, 1937 (No. 59); Minimum Age (Fisherman) Convention, June
3, 1959 (No. 112); Minimum Age (Underground Work) Convention, June 2, 1965 (No. 123);
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lation. 79 Although the impact of these international standards has
been, at times, less than global, 0 efforts to establish such standards have resulted in the creation of a comprehensive international labor code. 81
82
Child labor was one of the first issues addressed by the ILO.
In 1937, ILO Convention No. 59 declared fifteen to be the mini83
mum age for employment in industry. ILO Convention No. 13884
also sets the minimum age at fifteen years and further, allows signatory parties to lower the minimum age for employment to fourteen.8 5 In 1973, the ILO also recommended raising the minimum
age for hazardous employment to eighteen. 6 A comparison of
CLDA and the ILO's Minimum Age Recommendation of 1973 indicates that the age proposed by CLDA for industrial and hazardous
employment is actually three to four years younger than the ILO
international standard. It is submitted that the argument esMinimum Age Convention, June 6, 1973 (No. 138). INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL LABoUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919-1981 passim (1982).
79 Harlen Mandel, In Pursuitof the Missing Link: InternationalWorker Rights and In-

ternationalTrade?, 27 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 443, 460 n.83 (1989) (stating internationally recognized workers' rights incorporated into United States legislation are based on
five conventions of ILO). These conventions are as follows: Convention No. 1, standardizing
hours of work; Convention No. 5, fixing the minimum age for employment at fourteen for
industrial employment; Convention No. 11, the right to organize and the right of association; Convention No. 98, the right to collective bargaining; Convention No. 105, the call for
the abolition of forced labor; and Convention No. 131, which calls for the establishment of a
minimum wage standard. Id.
80 See generally TIK=rI, supra note 77, at 276-79 (discussing obligation of states to implement or ratify international labour conventions).
S See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL LABoUR CONVENTIONS AND REcOMMENDATIONS, 1919-1991 i-x (1992); Ehrenberg, supra, note 2, at 400 (comprehensively

explaining role of ILO).
82 Tonya, supra note 2, at 638-39 (discussing initial development of ILO, dealing with
child labor as one of first issues); see HANSSON, supra note 73, at 94 (noting child labor is
one of oldest subjects covered by international labor legislation).
83 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, supra note 72, arts. 227-34, at
140-44 (1939). Specifically, article 229 provides that children under the age of fifteen shall
not be employed in industry. Id. This convention was preceded by the 1921 ILO Convention
No. 5 which fixed the minimum age for industrial employment at fourteen. Timothy A.
Glut, Changingthe Approach to Ending Child Labor:An InternationalSolution to an International Problem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1203, 1226-27 (1995).
84 ILO Convention No. 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment,
June 26, 1973, in INTERNATIONAL LABoUR ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919-1981, at 730 (1982).

85 Id. art. 2(3). Convention No. 138 allows signatory nations to set the minimum age at
fourteen if needed due to economic or educational conditions. Id. art. 2(4). Also, the age for
employment that jeopardizes the health, safety or morals of the worker is set at eighteen.
Id. art. 3(1).
86 56 ILO Official Bull., No. 1, at 34-37 (1973); see Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 2,
at 668-69 (citing recommendation's main focus as social development of children); Mandel,
supra note 79, at 460 (stating that setting minimum age for employment is one of "most
fundamental ILO covenants").
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poused by CLDA's opponents, that the bill imposes ethnocentric
standards upon foreign countries, is inapposite.
I.

INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR STANDARDS

A.

InternationalLabor Organization
Nations have struggled continuously to incorporate labor stan8 7
dards and workers' rights into international trade agreements.
While the ILO clearly has established global standards, 8 enforcement of those standards has proven to be problematic.8 9 Pursuant
to the ILO, a signatory nation may lodge a complaint against another signatory nation upon that nation's failure to observe a convention ratified by both of them.90 Once a complaint has been submitted, the Governing Body of the ILO91 may either appoint a

87 See HANSSON, supra note 73, at 11-29. The author indicates nations have emphasized
international labor standards and international trade since the early nineteenth century.
Id. at 11-12. Hours of work and child labor were adopted at the congress held by the International Workingmen's Association in Geneva in 1866. Id. at 14-15. America established
high tariffs to rebuke exploitation of women and children in Europe. Id. at 15. In 1876 and
1877, the International Congress of Hygiene set uniform rules of hygiene and labor conditions. Id. at 15-16. European conventions to equalize costs of production and standardize
legislation were conducted throughout the late nineteenth and into the twentieth century.
Id. at 17-18. Numerous bilateral agreements were negotiated in the beginning of the twentieth century. Id. at 18. The Treaty of Versailles following World War I established the ILO.
Id. at 18-22. Following the Second World War, GATT "became the organization that would
govern the liberalization of international trade." Id. at 22-29. See generally JOYCE, supra
note 76, at 19-46 (analyzing rights of workers internationally).
88 See generally JOYCE, supra note 76 (exploring fundamental working rights shared by
all of mankind).
89 See Tonya, supra note 2, at 639-40 (noting ILO's insufficient enforcement mechanisms); see also Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 381-417 (concluding that ILO's ability to attain
compliance only through moral persuasion, publicity, shame, diplomacy, dialogue and technical assistance, renders it incapable of effectively disciplining violating countries). See
generally WALTER GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: AN AMERICAN
Vixw (1981) (providing extensive evaluation of structural and operational problems of ILO
which prompted United States to withdraw from program and expressing possible future
role of United States in ILO); GREGORY T. KRUGLAK, THE POLITICS OF UNITED STATES DECISION-MAKING IN UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES: THE CASE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

LABOR ORGANIZATION 1-4 (1980) (discussing "unusually complex" framework of ILO and
American withdrawal and subsequent reentry to organization).
90 See TnImrri, supra note 77, at 274-77. The nations that ratify a specific convention
must submit annual reports detailing the measures taken to implement the international
standard at the national level. Id.
91 See GALENSON, supra note 89, at 13. Within the ILO framework the Governing Body is
the executive committee. Id. Its responsibilities include making policy, preparing agenda
for conferences, electing the director general and hearing complaints. Id. The ILO is structured around three principal bodies: (1) the Governing Body, which meets three times a
year to set the agenda for the Conference, select the Director-General of the ILO and serve
as the ILO executive body; (2) the International Labour Conference, which is the ILO's
supreme policy-making and legislative organ; and (3) the International Labour Office,
which is headed by the Director-General, who oversees the daily activities of the ILO.
Tn=uT, supra note 77, at 3.
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Commission of Inquiry92 to examine the complaint or communicate the complaint to the government alleged to have violated the
convention, allowing that government to address the problem.9"
The Governing Body has broad discretion to secure compliance
with ILO conventions. 94 The ILO operates under the assumption
that ratifying countries will comply with the conventions.95 In the
event of noncompliance, where the alleged violating government
refuses the ILO recommendation, the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to make a final determination on the
6
matter.

9

Enforcement problems arise when a member state does not execute the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry or the International Court of Justice.97 Where these instances occur, the
ILO fails to provide a mechanism for imposing economic sanctions
in the event of non-compliance. 98 In the absence of effective compliance incentives, the ILO relies on moral persuasion and political pressure to promote the enforcement of workers' rights and
92 See TnurI, supra note 77, at 303. The three member Commission of Inquiry is responsible for investigating complaints and preparing reports for the Governing Body. Id.;
see also Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 387-88 (describing in detail complaint procedure followed by ILO).
93 TiKRrri, supra note 77, at 297. Allegations may also be brought via the representation
procedure that is specified in articles 24 and 25 of the constitution. Id. at 297. Any industrial organization of employers or workers may convey to the International Labour Office

that a member nation has not observed a convention to which it is a party. Id. at 299. The
Governing Body of the ILO also possesses the authority to initiate a complaint sua sponte,
or upon receiving notice of a complaint from a delegate of the International Labour Conference. Id. at 302-03; see also Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 387 (setting forth complaint procedure under ILO).
94 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, supra note 72, art. 26, cl. 4.
The Governing Body may bring complaints on its own motion or at the initiation of any
member of the International Labour Conference. Stensland, supra note 41, at 146.
95 Stensland, supra note 41, at 147 (noting ILO basis in understanding that members
will comply).
96 Tucarri, supra note 77, at 303-04. The International Court of Justice may affirm,
change or renounce the findings of the ILO and such determination is final. Id. Although
this authority appears to bolster the ILO's enforcement power over labor standards, as of
1992, the International Court of Justice has not resolved an international trade conflict.
GUNTHER JAENICKE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE CONFLICTS BEFORE THE PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, IN ADJUDICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND NATIONAL ECONoMIc LAw 43-

44 (Dr. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Dr. Gunther Jaenicke eds., 1992) [hereinafter ADUnmICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE].
97 See Stensland, supra note 41, at 147-48 (analyzing lack of force in ILO enforcement

mechanism); see also Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 389.
98 Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 390; see Glut, supra note 83, at 1226 (discussing lack of
enforcement provisions in ILO conventions).
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labor standards.9 9 Although the standards promoted by and
through the ILO represent an important attempt to achieve uniform labor practices, their limitations represent a current inability to address child labor violations adequately on a multilateral
level.100

B.

GATT and the World Trade Organization

GATT 10 1 is a multi-lateral forum for international commerce
that is intended to facilitate the elimination of global trade barriers. 10 2 After World War II, the United States and twenty-one
other nations signed the GATT accords in an attempt to stabilize
international trade. 103 The initial purpose of GATT was to reduce
tariffs worldwide.10 ' Due to the absence of any broad international
trade guidelines, however, GATT effectively became the central
authority linking national policies and international trade. 10 5 Its
informal structure has evolved into the world's primary multilat99 See generally Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 381-417 (discussing ILO's reliance on moral
persuasion and political pressure, resulting in less than adequate enforcement incentives).
100

See id. (indicating ineffectiveness of ILO enforcement mechanisms).

101 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61

Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947] (superseded by GATT 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994)). At its inception, the GATT was intended to be the intergovernmental agreement that regulated the flow of goods across national borders. See Michael Hart, Coercion
or Cooperation:Social Policy and Future Trade Negotiations, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 351, 382
(1994). In 1947, the members concern was with border disputes and not with product origin
and the original GATT sought to bring about non-discrimination between domestic and
foreign goods once they passed GATT requirements. Id.
102 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, opened for signatureApr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1126 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; see Hart, supra note 101, at
382 (noting GATT was negotiated and conceived as intergovernmental agreement designed
to regulate and influence flow of goods).
103 JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 73, at 398; see also Josh Schein, Section 301 and U.S.
Trade Law: The Limited Impact of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act on
American Obligations Under GATT, 1992 PAC. Rim L. & PUB. POL'Y J. 105, 106-07 (discussing GATT origin and history).
104 See Hart, supranote 101, at 382 (discussing original conceptions of GATT). See generally Robert E. Baldwin & David A. Kay, International Trade and International Relations,
in WORLD PoLITIcs AND INTERNATioNAL ECONOMICS 99, 100 (C. Fred Bergsten & Lawrence

B. Krause eds., 1975) (describing initial GATT objectives).
105 See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra 73, at 294. The International Trade Organization was
the entity intended to implement GATT, but after extensive hearing and debates, the
United States Congress moved away from liberal, international trade policy. Id. at 294-96.
Moreover, Congress' refusal to support the ITO effectively eradicated the ITO since most
nations were waiting to follow the United States' lead. Id. at 294-95; see also, Guy T. Petrillo, Note, Free Trade Area Agreements and U.S. Trade Policy, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1281, 1284 (1986) (discussing GATT's early role in international trade relations);
Schien, supra note 103, at 106 (describing main goal of GATT accords).
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eral agreement dealing with the trade of goods. 10 6 On January 1,
1995, GATT entered a new era with the emergence of the WTO, l0 7
which now serves as the arbiter of all issues regarding the Multilateral Trade Agreements.10 8 The agreement that established the
WTO 10 9 was the result of the Uruguay Round talks. 1 0 That agreement reiterates the goals previously sought under GATT."' These
goals include the promotion of global living standards, optimal use
of the world's resources, preservation of the environment, securing
participation in international trade by least-developed-nations
12
and developing an integrated and durable world trade system.
Unfortunately, neither the WTO, nor its predecessor in GATT, has
sought to eliminate child labor while furthering international
3
standards of living."I

106 See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 73, at 294 (discussing historical development of
GATT).
107 See JOSEPH DENNIN, LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 1-14
(1995) [hereinafter LAw & PRACTICE] (introducing GATT/WTO agreements and full text).
108 World Trade Organization Agreement, Dec. 15, 1993, para. 2, art. II, 33 I.L.M. 13, 15
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Services, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property are considered to be Multilateral Trade Agreements that bind all members of the GA IT and now the

World Trade Organization. Id. See generally PIERRE

PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF WTO/

GATT DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT 11-17 (1995) [hereinafter GAT HANDBOOK]. The plurilateral
agreements are the Civil Aircraft Agreement, the Bovine Meat Agreement and the Dairy
Products Agreement, and are included within GATT but are binding only on the signatories
of each agreement. Id. at 18.
109 WTO Agreement, at 13. Since the creation of GATT, several rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations have convened. Symposium, The Uruguay Round and the Future of
World Trade, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1992). The most ambitious of the negotiations took
place in 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay ("Uruguay Round"). Id. The scope of the Uruguay
Round encompassed many international trade issues, including, but not limited to, tariff
reductions, market access for products of lesser developed countries, trade in services, the
institutional structure of GATT, the functioning of the GATT system, and a dispute resolution mechanism. Id. at 2-3.
110 Uruguay Round, supra note 15, 33 I.L.M. 1125. After seven years, the signatory parties agreed to the establishment of the WTO to incorporate all changes to GATT and the
new agreements regarding such issues as the environment and intellectual property. Id.;
see also LAw & PRACTICE, supra note 107, at v-vi.
111 Id.
112 Uruguay Round, supra note 15, at 1144; GATT 1947, supra note 101, at 188. The
Preamble of the original GA IT stated objectives such as improving economic well being
throughout the world and increasing international trade by (i) substantially reducing tariffs and other trade barriers and (ii) eliminating discriminatory treatment in international
commerce. Id.; PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 108, at 10; see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTi ATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
MnSTERiAL DECISIONS AND DECLARATIONS COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHAIRMAN, available

in WESTLAW, GATT database, 1994 WL 761491, at *1. The Declaration from the Chairman of the Uruguay Round welcomed the new agreement as an achievement that "will
strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment, employment and income
growth throughout the world." Id.
113 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE URUGUAY RoUND AGREEMENTS ACT: STATEMENT AS To How THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACHIEvE CONGRES-
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The WTO will administer almost every aspect of world trade in
goods and services114 and will serve as the primary forum for disputes arising from such trade. 115 Under the WTO, trading partners are referred to as "members." 1 6 The members of GATT and

the new WTO are obliged to negotiate multilaterally to reduce tariffs, eliminate non-tariff barriers and, most importantly, refrain
from discriminatory treatment. 1 7 Each member will have a representative at the Ministerial Conference,"' which has the authority to facilitate the operation and further the objectives of the Multilateral Trade Agreements." 9 A General Council composed of
members' representatives executes the functions of the WTO
when the Conference is not in session. 120 Under the former GATT
12
system, the decision-making process was guided by consensus.
As such, GATT did not achieve any result unless a consensus was
reached. 12 2 According to the WTO, if no consensus is reached, a
decision is made by a majority vote .in which each member casts
one equally weighted vote. 123 This innovation should play an imSIONAL NEGOTIATING OBJECrVEs, available in WESTLAW, GATT database, 1994 WL
761805, at *1 [hereinafter Uruguay Round Achieves Negotiating Objectives]. The United
States was the key player in forcing the issue of workers' rights into the Uruguay Round
discussions and indicated that it did not intend to let the issue die with the ratification of
the WTO Agreement. Id. at *12. The statement explained the national objectives achieved
by the Uruguay Round. Id. at *1-13. It stated that although the attempt to have workers'
rights issues included on the Uruguay Round agenda failed, the United States will continue to address international labor standards as a "new issue" for the member countries of
the WTO to consider. Id. at *12. It also reported that the United States was collaborating
with the WTO Prepatory Committee to ensure that workers' rights remain on the WTO
agenda. Id.
114 See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization:A New Legal Order For
World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 355 (1995) (providing detailed discussion of scope,
functions and structure of WTO).
115 Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 395 (describing GATT'/WTO dispute settlement
procedures).
116 wVTO Agreement, art. IV, 33 I.L.M. at 16.
117 Ehrenberg, supra note 2, at 391; see PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 108, at 10 (providing overview of original and modem objectives of GATT); see also JACKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 73, at 296-98 (outlining GATT requirements).
118 WTO Agreement, at 16.
119 Id.

12o Id. The General Council also has responsibility for establishing the rules for the
WTO to follow, establishing the responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body and the
Trade Policy Review Body, and creating councils within the WTO on each multilateral
agreement. Id. at 16-17.
121 See PISCATORE ET AL., supra note 108, at 13 (examining GATT dispute settlement
process).
122 Id. at 13-14.
123 WTO Agreement, at 19. If a General Council interpretation of one of the trade agreements is not adopted by consensus, a three-fourths majority will reign. Id. The previous
consensus-only system prevented the effective enforcement of GATT. See PESCATORE ET AL.,
supra note 108, at 13-14. The Ministerial Conference and the General Council also have
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portant role in the implementation of new trade policy under current and future trade agreements by preventing a one-country
veto and allowing expedited resolutions under GATT.
III. THE CHILD LABOR DETERRENCE ACT
For the sixth consecutive year, Congress has responded to the
global problem of child labor with the introduction of the Child
Labor Deterrence Act. 124 This Note focuses on the Senate version
of CLDA, also referred to as the "Harkin Bill," sponsored by Senator Tom Harkin.12 5 The Harkin Bill has accumulated bipartisan
support in both Houses of Congress. 126 On the international level,
the United Nations and the ILO also have indicated their approval of CLDA. 127 Furthermore, 112 Nobel laureates have expressed a willingness to collaborate with Congress to enact and
28
enforce the Act.'
CLDA links international child labor and United States trade
policy by conditioning trade upon the securing of workers'
important decision making powers regarding the power to waive obligations under the
WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements by three-fourths majority and
amend the Multilateral Trade Agreements by two-thirds vote. WTO Agreement, supra note
108, at 19-20.
124 S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 2065, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see
Kelleher, supra note 2, at 168 n.50. The House bill differs significantly from that sponsored
by the Senate because the House Bill is inapplicable to articles produced by foreign manufacturers unless they do not "comply with the applicable national laws prohibiting child
labor in the workplace." Id. Strangely, this provision renders the remainder of the bill defining child labor and fixing a minimum age of 15 for employment, "basically irrelevant."
Id. at 169 n.53. Application of the House bill would result in punishment of countries with
child labor legislation and complete disregard of countries without such legislation. Id.
125 S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
126 140 CONG. REc. E1420-01 (1994) (statement of Rep. Brown). The Harkin Bill has
been co-sponsored by six senators. 1995 Bill Tracking S. 706; 104 Bill Tracking S. 706. The
House Bill sponsored by Representative Barney Frank and is co-sponsored by 33 representatives. 1995 Bill Tracking H.R. 2065; 104 Bill Tracking H.R. 2065. But see Epstein, supra
note 20, at A10 (suggesting Child Labor Deterrence Act had received less support in Congress than Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum, D-Ohio, a co-sponsor, had hoped). Cf Kamm,
supra note 18, at B9 (indicating that when President Clinton announced intention to link
future trade negotiations with international labor standards, all 44 Republican senators
responded "they would not support his request for fast track authority").
127 See 104 CONG. Exc. E1420-01 (1994) (statement of Rep. Brown) (stating ILO and
UNICEF, the United Nations child-welfare agency, have taken lead in supporting United
States' efforts to combat exploitative working conditions); Basu, supra note 7, at 2 (noting
CLDA has support of UNICEF and International Labor Organization).
128 See 140 CONG. REC. E1420-01 (1994) (statement of Rep. Brown). During an unprecedented public hearing held at the United States Labor Department in 1994 to discuss international child labor, 112 Nobel laureates "announced their plans to link the work of their
newly established organization, Childright Worldwide, with legislative and nonlegislative
initiatives to stop child exploitation." Id. This group was led by international leaders such
as Mother Theresa, Nelson Mandela, Rigoberta Menchu and the Dalai Lama. Id.
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rights.'2 9 The bill is an attempt to curtail the exploitation of children by preventing products manufactured by underage children
from entering the United States' market. 3 0 The underlying policies of CLDA are to prevent the use of child labor as a means of
becoming more competitive in international trade, 13 ' to ameliorate international trading rules, 1 3 2 and to alleviate poverty in de33
veloping countries.1
The Harkin Bill urges the President of the United States to seek
an agreement with trading partners regarding child exploitation
in the workplace.13 4 The bill prohibits the entry into the United
129 See Child Labor and the New Global Marketplace, supra note 7, at 8-10. Senator
Harkin urged the United States to use its far-reaching economic leverage and markets to
compel respect for basic human rights. Id.; see also 138 CONG. REc. S11,603-04, S11,607
(1992) (statement of Sen. Harkin). Senator Harkin argued that our country should refuse
to import any item from countries that depend on child labor to compete in the global marketplace. Id.; 140 CONG. REC. E1420-01 (1994) (statement of Rep. Brown). Representative
Brown recommended implementing a reward system for socially responsible businessmen
in marketplace at the expense of unscrupulous or uncaring exporters and importers. Id.
Brown further proposed that the United States encourage government leaders and prominent private businessmen in developing countries to work towards helping achieve socially
responsible trade that benefits workers and consumers in all countries. Id.; 135 CONG. REC.
H2161-02 (1989) (statement of Rep. Pease). Representative Pease indicated that effective
action hinges on the elimination of trading markets for goods made by exploited children.
Id.
See Kelleher, supra note 2, at 168-69. The article asserted that enactment of the Harkin
Bill would strengthen the link between international child labor and United States trade
policy. Id.; see also Tonya, supra note 2, at 655. The author cited to Congressman Pease's
view that "access to the American marketplace is powerful leverage and should be used
positively to encourage foreign producers and importers to treat defenseless children with
dignity." Id.; Newcomb, supra note 24, at 1. The author emphasized that the onus of protecting human rights belonged to the United States because of its status as the world's
largest importer of manufactured products from developing countries. Id.
130 S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1995); see 139 CONG. REC. S3173-01, 83179
(1993). In reintroducing the bill in 1993, Senator Harkin opined that the bill aims to eliminate child abuse and protect the dreams, childhood and future of children around the globe.
Id. Senator Harkin also expressed his view that the Bill is designed to raise the standard of
living in Third World countries so that we may "compete on the quality of goods" and not on
"the misery and suffering of those who make them." Id. Senator Harkin further claimed
that the bill assists Third World governments in enforcing their legislation by "ending the
role of the United States in providing a market for goods and encouraging other nations to
do the same." Id. Finally, Senator Harkin warned the President, "unless the economic exploitation of children is eliminated, the potential and creative capacity of future generations will forever be lost on the factory floor." Id.; see also Kelleher, supra note 2, at 169
n.52 (citing 139 CONG. REC. S3179 (1993)).
131 S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c) (1995); see 140 CONG. REc. E1420-01 (1994)
(statement of Rep. Brown) (indicating CLDA rewards socially responsible businessmen to
detriment of uncaring or unscrupulous importers and exporters).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. § 3. To further its underlying purpose the bill implores the President to seek
agreement with United States trade partners "securing an international ban on trade in
the products of child labor." Id.; see 140 CONG. REc. E1420-01 (1994) (statement of Rep.
Brown). Representative Brown also urged the President to seek an agreement securing a
ban on international of products made by children. Id.
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States of any manufactured article 13 5 produced by a foreign nation
or industry that utilizes child labor. 136 According to the terms of
the Harkin Bill, once a product is identified as one of child labor,
the Secretary of Labor may ban its importation into the United
States. 137 This ban, however, would not apply if importers certify
that the product was not derived from child labor. 138 A ban placed
on a foreign industry can be revoked in appropriate circumstances, 13 9 as where the Secretary of Labor finds that the foreign
industry and the host country are no longer using child labor in
40
the manufacture of products.
CLDA prescribes both civil and criminal penalties14 1 for violations of the Act. 1 4 2 Most significantly, CLDA advocates educational and developmental alternatives to the employment of underage children. 43 This provision is intended to address concerns
that enforcement of the act will result in massive unemployment
of millions of child laborers and will, therefore, eventually prove
135 S. 706 § 8(1)(A). "Manufactured articles" are those that are, in whole or in part,
fabricated, assembled processed, or mined. Id.
136 S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a)(1) (1995). While the foreign industry and its host
country are being identified, the Secretary is directed to prohibit entry of any products of
that foreign industry. Id.
137 Id. § 4(a)-(b). CLDA directs the Secretary of Labor to identify those foreign industries
that utilize child labor in the exportation of products as well as allows third parties to file
petitions requesting the identification of violators. Id.
138 Id. § 5(b). The Secretary shall require written documentation that reasonable steps
were taken to ensure the product was not made by child labor. Id.
139 Id. § 4(d) (1995). The Secretary is empowered to revoke "the identification of any foreign industry and its host country" upon receiving information making such action appropriate. Id.
140 Id. § 4(d)(2)(A). Before revocation can occur, the Secretary must first submit a written report to Congress stating the opinion that child labor is not being utilized in either
production or export, including the facts upon which the opinion is based and the reasons
why the Secretary feels revocation is appropriate. Id. § 4(dX2XA),(B). Proposed revocation
would require publication in the Federal Register and an invitation for public comment
before such revocation could become effective. Id. § 4 (d)(3).
141 S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)-(c) (1995). Violators are liable for civil penalties
of up to $25,000, and criminal penalties of fines from $10,000 to $35,000 and/or one year
imprisonment. Id.
142 Id. § 6(c). The bill states that "any person" will be liable for attempting to enter a
manufactured article from an CLDA identified foreign industry. Id. § 6(a)(1). The criminal
liability is imposed by the CLDA only when the entry was intentional. Id. § 6(c). Accordingly, it seems that the violators of an enacted CLDA would most likely be corporate entities in the importing business.
143 S. 706 § 9. This section appropriates $10,000,000 for the fiscal years from 1996
through 2000 to the President to be expended as a United States contribution to both the
International Labor Organization, to assist its International Program on the Elimination of
Child Labor, and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, to aid the Subcommittee and Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery in combatting bonded child
labor. Id.
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detrimental to children.1 4 4 In fact, the Harkin Bill incorporates
measures which address the displacement of children previously

relegated to child labor. 145

CLDA echoes a developing global trend that links trade and
child labor. 146 The prospect of CLDA's enactment has prompted
several foreign governments to reveal their opposition to the commercial exploitation of children. 147 Accordingly, similar legislative
proposals linking child labor with trade have surfaced throughout
Europe. 148 The mere proposition of CLDA, however, has not been
144 See Kelleher, supra note 2, at 184-85. The author maintains that the assumption that
removing children from the work force will benefit the child is false. Id. at 184. Kelleher
contends that in high poverty areas, the absence of work could actually lead to a variety of
social, moral and health risks since it will decrease income that is needed for nutritional
and health support. Id. at 185. Moreover, the author suggests that lack of educational opportunities, coupled with the prohibition of employment, defeats the possibility for the personal development of children. Id.
145 S. 706 § 2(b)(2). The Act supports initiatives extending "primary education, rehabilitation, and alternative skills training" to child laborers. Id. These contributions are in accord with the United States policy of increasing assistance to eradicate the poverty that so
often gives rise to the incidence of child labor. Id. § 2(c)(4); see 140 CONG. REc. E1420-01
(1994) (statement of Rep. Brown). Introducing CLDA, Representative Brown stressed the
necessity of having the United States contribute financially to beneficial alternatives for
the development of displaced child workers. Id.; see also Onapito-Ekomoloit, supra note 7,
at *1. Onapito-Ekomoloit's article dispels the argument that CLDA exhibits ambivalence
towards children by pointing to the United States' contributions to the International Labor
Organization and the United Nations. Id.
146 See 140 CONG. REC. S15,077-01, 15,088 (1994) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (criticizing GAT for failing to "link trade privileges to child labor protections"); see also Child
Labor and the New Global Marketplace, supra note 7, at 4-6 (statement of Sen. Howard M.
Metzenbaum) (urging link between trade privileges and child labor protections as requisite
for continued open markets around world); Malaysia Wants Third World Unity Against
Wage-Trade Link, AsiAN ECON. NEWS KYODO NEws INT'L, Apr. 11, 1994 (indicating United
States and France hope that wage-trade link in WTO will monitor use of child labor); Reich
Won't Use Job Plan to Aid NAFTA: 'Dislocation'Aid Will be Insurance Policy, He Says,
STATE J. REG. (Springfield), Oct. 16, 1993, at 10 (noting North American Free Trade Agreement between United States, Canada and Mexico links free trade benefits to enforcement
of child labor laws). But see Terry Collingsworth et al., MultinationalBusinesses are Killing
the Goose that Lays the Golden Egg, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 6, 1994, at G7 (stating view of
free-traders that although child labor is abhorrent, linking trade with social legislation
violates trade law).
147 See Carney, supra note 7, at 4 (suggesting CLDA has already caused some importers
and manufacturers to take corrective action); see also Kamm, supra note 18, at B9 ("Despite the fact that the Harkin-Brown bill is still pending, its effect has been felt in South
Asia."); Newcomb, supra note 24, at 1 (stating that United States can influence exploitation
of children overseas, as proven by fact that many countries have begun to regulate child
labor following introduction of CLDA); N. Vasuki Rao, Curbs on Child Labor Gain Momentum in S. Asia, J. CoM. (N.Y. Times), July 10, 1995, at A5 (noting countries such as India,
Pakistan and Bangladesh are moving to eliminate child labor due to pressure from Western countries); Rothstein, supra note 18, at F3 (indicating possible enactment of CLDA has
received attention internationally).
148 See 140 CONG. REC. E1,420-01, E1,420-01 (1994) (statement of Rep. Brown). "Very
soon Frau Brigitte Adler, a Social Democratic Party member of the German Bundestag,
will introduce counterpart legislation to our bill [CLDA]." Id. Furthermore, a coalition of
German, French, Belgian and Dutch Parliamentarians expect to pass similar legislation in
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enough to prevent the majority of abuses of child labor abroad. 149
Thus, passage of CLDA is necessary to initiate a global 15
movement
0
toward compliance with international labor standards.
IV.

POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE

CLDA

ON

A comparison of CLDA to past United States' trade legislation
indicates a GATT dispute settlement review of the bill would find
it to be GATT-illegal. CLDA, if enacted, would be the sixth piece
of United States' legislation to link international child labor standards with trade practices. 15 1 A majority of the prior legislation
provides trade benefits to developing countries that have taken
1 52
steps to recognize international labor standards.
the European Union. Id.; see also Percival, supra note 18, at *1. Fifteen European Union
states have taken steps towards applying trade sanctions against countries that do not
recognize labor rights. Id. Germany's legislature, the Bundestag, recently raised a proposal
to link child labor with trade. Epstein, supra note 22, at A10. European politicians are
urging the European trading union to add 'social clauses' on child labor to trade agreements. Id.
149 See 138 CONG. REc. S11,603-04, S11,607 (1992) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (noting
UNICEF estimates that nearly 200 million children are working in industry and manufacturing in developing countries); see also Wright, supra note 19, at C3 (citing ILO estimate
of one in four children between ages 10 and 14 working in Third World countries).
150 See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, FairTrade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459, 525 n.78 (1994). The author discusses the fact that non-member
countries do not enjoy the receipt of favors equivalent to member countries, creating incentive to join GATT and avoid discrimination, which means lowering trade barriers or "paying" a fee to join. Id. Accordingly, an enacted and enforced CLDA may achieve the same
result.
151 Kelleher, supra note 2, at 163. Five acts currently exist. See Generalized System of
Preferences of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. V, §§ 501-05, 88 Stat. 2066
(1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65 (1994)) (authorizing President, after
receiving advice from trade agencies, to designate articles eligible for duty-free status);
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, tit. II, subtit A §§ 201-18, 97
Stat. 384 (1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (1994)) (authorizing President to designate articles from Caribbean countries eligible for duty free status based on
stable political and economic climate); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195,
pt. I, ch. 2, tit. IV, § 231 as added Dec. 30, 1969 Pub. L. No. 91-175, pt. I, § 105, 83 Stat. 809
(1961) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994)) (creating corporation to mobilize
and facilitate United States private investment activity in less-developed nations); Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Enabling Statute, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 101(c), 101
Stat. 1329-131, 1329-134 (1987) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 290k (1994)) (authorizing President to accept membership in Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency); Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. III, ch. 1, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)) (calling for President to retaliate against action taken
by foreign entities inconsistent with any United States trade agreements). Section 301 was
amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit.
1, subtit. C, pt. 1, § 1301(a), 102 Stat. 1164 (1989) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1994)), which provides for new investment and incentives for trading with developing
countries, through domestic policy reforms. Id.
152 See Kelleher, supra note 2, at 164 (discussing existing American legislation with respect to international child labor and United States trade policy). Several statutes provide
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Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
("OCTA"),153 however, like CLDA, penalizes trade partners for
failure to recognize certain labor standards and authorizes the
United States Trade Representative to take unilateral retaliatory
action against trade partners who violate certain recognized workers' rights.154 Enforcement of Section 301 is inconsistent with
GATT since it defies the presumption that members of GATT will
refrain from unilateral
retaliation and will reconcile grievances on
1 55
a multilateral level.

Because CLDA employs a unilateral rather than a multilateral
approach to the child labor problem, enforcement of the bill will
put the United States in direct conflict with its corresponding obligations under the WTO. 156 Although Section 301 of the OCTA authorizes the President to utilize "all appropriate and feasible acfor the recognition of "internationally recognized workers' rights" and define such rights to
include the right of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, a prohibition
of forced or compulsory labor, the right to acceptable working conditions and an unspecified
minimum age for the employment of children. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7)(1994); 19 U.S.C.
§ 2702 (bX7) (Supp. II 1990); 22 U.S.C. § 2191(a) (1994).
153 Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. III, ch. 1, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)). Section 301 was later amended by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418, tit. I, subtit. C, pt. 1,
§ 1301(a), 102 Stat. 1164 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)). Section
301 authorizes the President to use all feasible action to enforce United States trade rights,
including the discriminatory treatment of the products of one foreign country or instrumentality. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(a)-(b). The President may withhold trade benefits or impose import restrictions for an appropriate length of time. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c). The power that the
President is granted by this Act seems to infer that, even without an enacted CLDA, the
President could deny entry into the United States any product made by child labor. Id.
154 19 U.S.C § 2411(c) (1988). The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act represents

the first time United States legislation mandated the implementation of workers' rights as
a pre-requisite for the receipt of trade benefits. Id. The theory underlying this protective
policy over workers' rights is that producers who violate rights of workers are able to lower
production costs, giving the trade partner an unfair market advantage via artificially low
prices. Id. The legislation sought to prevent this disparity in the market by conditioning
trade benefits on implementation of recognized worker rights. Id.
155 See Schein, supra note 103, at 114. The author describes "multilateralism" as embodying the presumption that GATT members will settle grievances through GATT or appropriate international bodies and will refrain from employing unilateral retaliation. Id. The
author also suggests that although the Section 301 provisions are broad enough to allow
the President to suspend trade concessions and impose duties unilaterally, the section is
not intended to be invoked in such a drastic manner. Id. at 115. Instead, it advocates that
the United States seek multilateral consultations under the relevant international trade
agreements. Id. at 111; see also Hashimoto Terms 'Super 301' as Inconsistent with WTO,
JAPAN ECON. NEwswmE, Sept. 28, 1995, available in WESTLAW, JWIRE database. Recent
implementation of a "Super 301" trade negotiation procedure has drawn a negative reaction from Japan's International Trade and Industry Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. Id. The
inconsistency between Section 301 and the WTO could lead to the United States initiating
procedures against Japan. Id.
156 See Mitchell Zuckoff, Rugmark' Certifies No Child Labor Was Used, Cm. Tam., Feb.
4, 1995, at 16 (suggesting CLDA would conflict with GATT'); see also Zuckoff, supra note 17,
at 77 (noting CLDA would put United States in conflict with GATT).
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tion" against countries whose acts violate United States rights or
benefits under any trade agreement, including a ban on products
from foreign nations, 5 7 CLDA extends the government's reach.
This added control is found in CLDA's explicit prescription for a
direct ban of all imports produced by child labor, and its provision
for the use of criminal as well as civil penalties. 158 Since GATT
seeks to avoid precisely those unilateral measures which permit
member nations to invoke restrictions such as those authorized by
CLDA, 5 9 any future CLDA ban has the potential to be even more
violative of GATT than Section 301.160
As a result of GATT's failure to include restrictions on child labor, the United States would have a difficult time defending
CLDA's validity as a permissible trade restriction.' 6 1 For instance, the United States would likely attempt to counter a charge
that CLDA is a GATT-illegal unilateral measure by arguing that
CLDA qualifies as a general exception to GATT Article XX's prohibition against such measures, because the bill is designed to protect the "national welfare. " 1 62 The United States may then at157 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(a)-(b) (1994). The President is authorized to take all appropriate
and feasible action within his power to enforce this act, with respect to trade or any area of
relations with foreign countries. Id.
158 S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)-(c) (1995). According to the bill, violators are
liable for civil penalties of up to $25,000 and criminal penalties of fines from $10,000 to
$35,000 and/or one year imprisonment. Id.
159 GATT 1947, art. XI, at 224. Article XI is entitled GeneralEliminationof Quantitative
Restrictions. Id. The first paragraph of Article XI disallows prohibitions and restrictions
against contracting parties based on quotas, license requirements and other measures. Id.
at 224-26.
160 See GATT 1947, art. XI, at 224. Complaints leveled against the United States for
action taken under an enacted and enforced CLDA would most likely be based on Art. XI,
which bans measures that nullify or impair the benefits of trade partners. Id. Complaints
under the WTO/GATT invoke the dispute settlement mechanism that is based on Article
XXIII of GATT. Id. art. XXIII, at 226. Article XXIII:1 allows one party to GATT to file a
complaint against another party in the event the grieving party feels that GATT benefits or
objectives are being nullified or impaired. Id. at 266; see also Zuckoff, supra note 17, at 77
(noting that CLDA supporters acknowledge proposed legislation appears to be illegal under
GATT). Under GATT, unanimous consent of trade partners is required to impose a sanction upon any member. Id. Under WTO, the United States no longer has the ability to block
sanctions because the requirement has been reversed: "unanimous consent is not required
to impose sanctions." Id.
161 See HANssoN, supra note 73, at 30-31. While the United States wants child labor
restrictions to be a part of international agreements, the issue was not included in the
Uruguay Round agreements due in great part to immense disagreement as to whether such
a provision should be included in economic agreements. Id. at 30. Dr. Hansson notes that
the main arguments against uniform labor standards in trade agreements pivot upon geographical, cultural, and economic differences, which render uniform application virtually
impossible. Id. at 29.
162 GATT 1947, art. XX, at 262. Article XX, entitled General Exceptions, aims to exempt
select governmental measures concerned with the protection of national welfare. See Kelle-
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tempt to establish CLDA as an internal regulation that treats
both foreign and domestic products alike, in accordance with the
provisions of GATT Article 111.163 A look at a recent GATT dispute
settlement panel decision, in which the United States tried unsuccessfully to use this rationale to justify the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA), 1' however, indicates CLDA would meet a
similar fate.
In the 1991 Tuna Import Dispute,1 6 5 Mexico alleged that a
United States boycott pursuant to the MMPA, which sought to restrict Mexico's methods of tuna fishing, violated GATT as a unilateral import restriction. 166 The United States argued that the restriction was necessary to protect the life and health of dolphins
outside the United States 6 ' and as such, fit within GATT article
XX's prohibitions established to protect animal, human and plant
life. The GATT dispute resolution panel16 8 held that the exception
her, supra note 2, at 173 n.77. GATr shall not be construed as preventing the enforcement
of measures that are necessary to protect "public morals, human, animal or plant life or
health, or that relate to products of prison labour." Id.; see also GATT 1947, supra note
101, art. XX, at 262. These exceptions are prefaced in Article XX with the statement that
they are not to be applied in a manner constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or as a disguised restriction of
international trade. Id.
163 See GATT 1947, supra note 101, at 204 (amended by Protocol modifying part II and
Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed at Geneva, Sept. 14,
1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 80). Article III recognizes that internal laws should not be applied to
imports in an effort to protect domestic production. 62 U.N.T.S. at 82. It further provides
that imported products not be subject to restrictions not imposed on like domestic products.
Id. at 82; see also Kelleher, supra note 2, at 173 nn.75, 76 (describing language of Article
III). The author discusses the Article III provisions of GATT, concluding that their intention is to provide equal treatment to domestic and imported products; therefore, internal
regulations effected by a United States' ban on all products of child labor would not disfavor
imports. Id.
164 Pub. L. No. 95-522, 86 Stat. 1027, 1030 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(2)(e) (1994)). The Act prohibits the importation of tuna into the United States
when the importer uses fish harvesting techniques which cause incidental death of marine
mammals in excess of United States standards set for the production of tuna. Id. The Act
further permits the Secretary of Commerce to impose the ban. Id.
165 General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel, Report on
United States Restriction on Imports of Tuna (submitted to the parties Aug. 16, 1991), 30
I.L.M. 1594, 1598-623 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna Import Dispute].
166 Tuna Import Dispute, supra note 165, paras. 3.34-3.35, at 1606. See Kelleher, supra
note 2, at 173-74 n.78 (describing Tuna Imports Dispute). GATT generally prohibits trade
restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges. GATT 1947, supra note 101, Art. XI,
para. 1, at 224.
167 Tuna Import Dispute, supra note 165, para. 5.24.
168 The dispute resolution system under the GATT was one of the many changes made
after the Uruguay Round. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. IV, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 122829 (1994) (describing new procedures for dispute settlement in the WTO) [hereinafter
GATT Dispute Understanding]. Under the new system, a report from the WTO dispute
panel will bind members in the absence of a consensus for veto of the ruling. LAw & PRAC-
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was limited to restrictions promulgated for the protection of life
within the borders of the importing country. 169 The GATT panel
also concluded that domestic regulations must relate to the product itself and not to the method of production. 70 The panel noted
that an interpretation of GATT which would allow a country to
justify unilateral measures to protect life outside its borders is incompatible with GATT and would provide trade security only to
those nations which have similar internal regulations.' 71 Since a
CLDA ban premised upon protection of children in the exporting
it would
countries would not be protecting United States citizens,
7 2
rationale.1
Dispute
Import
Tuna
likely fail under the
Ninety percent of child labor worldwide is either forced, bonded
or indentured,1 7 3 and, therefore, a viable argument for passage of
CLDA may be that the vast majority of its bans on imports are
consistent with a GATT provision allowing bans on products derived from prison labor.174 Since the issue would be one of first
impression, it is possible that the United States might successfully persuade the members of GATT and the WTO to legitimize
this analogy, and thus amend its framework to include child labor
prohibitions. Because GATT dispute resolution panels interpret
TICE, supra note 107, at vi. The commentator suggests that although the United States was
at the forefront of the effort to obtain a binding, transparent, and legalistic dispute resolution mechanism, such mechanisms may undercut existing United States child labor,
health, safety, and environmental laws. Id. According to the Office of the United States
Trade Representative, the new agreement ensures that the GATT obligations will be fully
implemented and consistently applied and that there will now be a system of procedures
that allows for the swift and fair settlement of disputes. Id. URUGUAY RouND AcHIEVEs
NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES, supra note 113, at *1. The USTR statement also states that
"[c]ountries whose laws are found to be inconsistent with a Uruguay Round agreement will
have to implement obligations promptly." Id. at *7.
169 Tuna Import Dispute, supra note 165, paras. 5.28-5.29, at 1620.
170 Tuna Import Dispute, supra note 165, paras. 5.14-5.15, at 1618. See generally Alexandra Haner, Comment, Will the European Union Packaging Directive Reconcile Trade
and the Environment, 18 FoRDHAM INL L.J. 2187, 2196-201 (1995) (describing GATT
Panel report in Tuna Import Dispute).
171 Tuna Import Dispute, supra note 165, para. 5.27, at 1620.
172 See Ernest E. Smith, Environmental Issues for the '90s: Golden-Cheeked Warblers
and Yelowfin Tuna, 47 ME. L. Rxv. 345, 361 (1995) (observing that United States bans on
textiles produced by child labor and harmful to environment would meet same fate as
MMPA). See generally Hon. R. Kenton Musgrave & Garland Stephens, The GATT-Tuna
Dispute: An Update, 33 NAT. RESOURCE S J. 957, 957 (1993) (discussing tuna dispute at
length).
173 See Epstein, supra note 20, at A10 (quoting Department of Labor Report); ILO Finds,
supra note 20, at *3 (describing parents selling children to pay debts).
174 See GATT 1947, para. I(e), at 262 (allowing measures to deter products of prison
labor).
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Article XX exceptions narrowly, 175 and because the panels are
hostile to the regulation of foreign countries by contracting parties, 7 6 the likelihood of this argument persuading a GATT panel
seems quite remote.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

In offering a solution to the problem of child labor vis-a-vis
GATT/WTO prohibitions against unilateral action, it is necessary
to note that GATT restrictions against discriminatory treatment
apply only to contracting parties. 177 There are numerous countries
that are not members of GATT, such as China, Taiwan, the former
Soviet Republics, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Guatemala, which could
serve as potential targets of a CLDA ban without GATT ramifications.178 These countries are referred to as non-subsidy agreement
countries. 179 GATT does not prohibit unilateral action against
these non-subsidy agreement countries.' s0 Additionally, the
United States can make support for membership in the WTO and
175 See Christopher A. Cherry, Environmental Regulation Within the GATT Regime: A
New Definition of "Product",40 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1993) (offering United StatesMexico Dispute for proposition that GATT dispute resolution panels interpret exceptions
narrowly).
176 See id. at 1070 (noting GATT panels hostility towards prospects of members regulating matters outside their borders).
177 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1994). The United States deals with member countries differently than with non-member countries. Id. This statute provides that an initial determination of material injury to a United States industry must be made if countervailing duties
are to be imposed against a "Subsidies Agreement" country. Id. § 1671(a). No material injury needs to be determined if the same is sought to be imposed against non-Subsidies
Agreement countries. Id. § 1671(c); see also JOHN P. KARAS, INTERNATIONAL JoINT VENTuREs: A PRACICAL GUIDE 294 n.25 (1992). Karalis notes that the United States Code handles retaliation against non-members of GAT distinctly from members of GATT. Id.; cf. 19
U.S.C. § 3521 (1994) (allowing President to increase tariffs against any country not part of
World Trade Organization that does not accord United States adequate trade benefits).
178 See Donna D. Skeen, Can CapitalismSurvive Under Communist Rule? The Effect of
Hong Kong's Reversion to the People's Republic of China in 1997, 29 IN-r'L LAw. 175, 195-97
(1995) (discussing China's attempts to regain GAIT membership); see also David A.
Codevilla, Inland Steel and the Implementation of the Uruguay Round of GATT 1994, 3
GEo. MASON INDEPENDENT L. REV. 435, 469 (1995) (criticizing as height of hypocrisy,

United States imposition of countervailing duties against non-members of GATT such as
China, Taiwan and former Soviet Republics); Michael Gaugh, GATT Article XXI and U.S.
Export Controls: The Invalidity of Nonessential Non-ProliferationControls, 8 N.Y. INT'L L.
Rev. 51, 87-88 (1995) (discussing non-membership of Syria, China and Libya); Andreas
Lowenfeld, Economic Sanctions:A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1930,
1942 (1990) (characterizing GATT non-members as potential targets for sanctions).
179 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1994). A Subsidy Agreement Country means a World Trade Organization Member. Id. §1671(b).
180 Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning:GATT Rules and Their Application to
Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TuL. ENVTL. L. J. 299 n.97 (1994); see Charnovitz, supra
note 150, at 470, 525 (noting that discrimination is inherent in trade involving non-member
of GAIT).
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GATT contingent on that country's addressing the problem of
child labor.'
Regarding subsidy-agreement countries, the United States
could work with members of WTO to develop side agreements addressing labor standards. A bilateral or plurilateral agreement
between the United States and any number of contracting parties
may indirectly pressure remaining nations to support the side
agreement. The appropriate model for such an amendment is the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation or the "Labor
Side Agreement,"' 8 2 which was negotiated
as a side accord to the
8 3
North American Free Trade Agreement.1
The Labor Side Agreement recognizes five international standards regarding workers' rights and enforces existing national
laws in the United States, Canada, and Mexico.' 8 4 This Labor
Side Agreement builds upon existing domestic labor standards, 8 5
allowing them to serve as a starting point for the development of
multilateral standards. 8 6 An agreement such as this would require only that each signatory enforce its own labor laws, 8 7 avoiding any claims regarding cultural differences or hegemony. Since a
side agreement could be brought to fruition on a multilateral level,
GATT/WTO would have authority to review any disputes and effectively to bind the parties to their own labor standards.'88 A side
agreement supported by two-thirds of the membership in the
181 Cf Lori F. Damrosch, GATT Membership in a Changing World Order: Taiwan,
China, and the Former Soviet Republics, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 19, 34-36 (noting
United States' support for China's membership in GATT and WTO induced China into ending toleration of piracy of United States intellectual property).
182 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1502-18 (1993) [hereinafter Labor Side
Agreement].
183 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: FourApproaches to
TransnationalLaborRegulation, 16 MicH. J. INr'I L. 987, 1007 (1995). The agreement was
negotiated by President Clinton before NAFTA was submitted to Congress for approval in
an effort to address organized labor's perceived threat to United States jobs. Id.
184 See Stensland, supra note 41, at 158-63 (evaluating Labor Side Agreement as useful
multilateral link between employee rights and trade benefits).
15 Labor Side Agreement, supra note 182, Annex 1, at 1515-16 (setting forth broad labor
principles that parties to Agreement promoted, including labor protections for children and
young persons).
186 See Stone, supra note 183, at 1007-08 (discussing the innovative attempt of Labor
Side Agreement to harmonize labor conditions between countries).
187 See Stensland, supra note 41, at 159 (noting Labor Side Agreement compels members
to set forth and enforce their labor standards).
18M Labor Side Agreement, supra note 182, art. 27(1), at 1509. The "Labor Side Agreement" provides for a dispute settlement panel to be invoked if there is a failure of one party
to enforce its labor standards. Id. The parties can then take action that comports with the
panel decision. Id.
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WTO is a very attainable multi-lateral solution to the problem of
child labor.
As a unilateral ban on imports, CLDA is likely to violate the
terms of GATT.' 89 A more effective approach would be for the
United States to confront the problem multilaterally. Although
the ILO's conventions lack enforcement mechanisms, they are
available to provide the necessary guidelines for international
workers' rights. 190 In addition, the United Nations has supported
other international child labor standards, evincing a widespread
concern for this issue and providing the international substantive
basis for any new agreements. 1 9 ' The United States should maintain its position of continuously advocating the inclusion of labor
standards in trade legislation' 9 2 and working to amend GATT to
include requirements for workers' rights and regulation of child
19 3
labor.

189 See Zuckoff, supra note 156, at 16 (suggesting CLDA would conflict with GATT); see
also Zuckoff, supra note 17, at 78 (noting CLDA would put United States in conflict with
GAIT).
190 See generally JOYCE, supra note 76, at 19-46 (analyzing fimdamental working rights
of workers internationally).
191 See U.N. CENTRE FOR HUmAN RIGHTS, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIrrs OF THE CHILD
174 (1989) (noting fruition of 65 year attempt to achieve formal international legal recogni-

tion of human rights of children); U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. DECLARATION OF

THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 171 (1989) (giving official recognition to human rights of children); Programmeof Action for the Elimination of the Exploitation of Child Labour, 1 IHRR
227 (1994) (imploring entire international community to attack exploitation of child labor
and urge immediate action to meet needs of children exposed to grave danger). International labor standards have been supported by the United Nations via the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, the Commission on Human Rights, with the Programme of Action
for the Elimination of the Exploitation of Child Labour and the European Community and
its Council Directive on the protection of young people at work. See generally INTERNATIONAL CONVElNTIONS ON PROTECTION OF HumANrry
AND ENVIRONMENT 86-100 (Gunter Hoog
& Angela Steinmetz eds., 1993) (containing full text of Convention on the Rights of the
Child); Skoler, supra note 28, at 86-100 (providing in depth discussion of Convention on
Rights of Child).
192 See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 2, at 670-71 (noting success of United States'
enforcement of child labor regulations in decreasing incidence of child labor); see also International Labor: Otero Says for Now U.S. FavorsILO as Forum for World Labor Standards,
1995 DAILY LA. RPr. 66, 66 (reporting statement of United States Deputy Undersecretary
of Labor, Joaquin Otero, that United States is committed to implementation of labor standards into world trade framework); New Labor-StandardsPush, ARI. REPUBLIC, Apr. 5,
1995 (indicating United States will push for talks on labor standards as long as human
exploitation continues).
193 See WTO Agreement art. X, at 20 (providing procedures for amendments to WTO
agreement). The Multilateral Trade Agreements may be amended by two-thirds vote of the
members, with some agreements needing consensus. GATT Handbook, supra note 108, at
13.
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CONCLUSION

The exploitation of child labor continues to be an immense problem. Unfortunately, the problem has not been eradicated through
the socio-economic development of third-world countries fueled by
global trade. The exploitation of children is on the rise. Existing
international agreements are ineffective as a means of enforcing
child labor standards. The ideal solution to the problem of child
labor would be the procurement of child labor provisions in the
WTO through dispute-resolution and amendment procedures.
Until such time that this resolution becomes possible, there is a
need for a more realistic, pragmatic approach to the problem of
child labor. As a result of the inability of international trade
agreements to respond multilaterally to the growing problem,
CLDA confronts the issue head-on with a unilateral ban on imports of child labor. Although United States enforcement of CLDA
against co-signatories to the GATT/WTO would violate the existing WTO framework, CLDA may be enforced against non-subsidy agreement countries with impunity as well as used as a contingency for United States support for entry into the GATT/WTO.
This Note recommends that Congress enact CLDA into law and
immediately begin enforcing it against non-subsidy agreement
countries. The United States should join with other countries opposed to child labor and use the Labor Side Agreement resulting
from the NAFTA trade talks as a paradigm for an agreement supplementing GATT/WTO. An agreement such as this would be a
practicable, multilateral approach to the child labor problem.
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